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What was the point?
Raiding in the Summer of 1917
Geoffrey Jackson

C

anadian military historians
have argued that through the
Canadian Corps’ flexibility and
initiative, the Canadians had become
the masters of trench raiding by
1917.1 Raiding, so the argument goes,
had a number of benefits. It gave
the Canadian Corps an offensive
esprit de corps, helped soldiers and
junior officers escape the supposed
monotony of trench warfare, seriously
undermined German morale, and
not the least, allowed the troops
and Canadian headquarters to gain
invaluable intelligence about enemy
dispositions as well as familiarity
with the terrain over which the Corps
might soon be attacking.2 However,
raiding was also seen to carry with
it certain costs, and at times the
Canadian Corps frankly debated its
usefulness. As Tim Cook noted in
Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the
Great War, 1917-1918, while
Arthur Currie recognized the
importance of raids in providing
essential battle skills for his troops,
he also knew the casualties sustained
in these missions were taking out
his best men. When he raised his
concerns with Byng, the senior corps
commander chided him for being too
cautious…3

When Currie was promoted to lead
the Canadian Corps in June of 1917,

Abstract: This article examines the
effectiveness of raiding by the 4th
Canadian Division in July and August
1917. The 4th Division carried out
extensive raiding during this period,
however, the raiding did not give the
4th Division any noticeable advantage
when they attacked the city of Lens at
the end of August. This paper concludes
that raiding did not bring any benefit for
the division.

he seemed to have at least temporarily
cast aside his reservations about the
cost of raiding, and during the next
few months set an intensive raiding
program for units.
A closer examination of the
raiding program mounted by the 4th
Division in the summer of 1917 shows
that the operations undertaken,
though successful in their own right,
failed to generate many of these
supposed benefits for the division’s
main attack on Lens launched in midAugust. In this instance, at least, it
needs to be asked what was actually
learned from the raids, and equally
important, how was the information
employed? This paper will argue
that on the 4th Division front during
July and August of 1917, even if
individual attacks were successful,
the overall benefit from raiding did
not warrant the cost incurred.
From early 1916 onward, trench
raiding had become a routine practice
for the Canadian Corps. It was further
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institutionalized in the winter of
1916-1917 when British General
Headquarters ordered every British
and dominion division to carry out
at least two raids per month.4 This
may have been done for intra-allied
political considerations, so that Field
Marshal Douglas Haig, commanderin-chief of the British Expeditionary
Force (BEF), could point to the large
number of BEF raids as a rebuttal if
the hard-pressed French complained
of British “inactivity.”5 That said, by
the summer of 1917 not every division
in the BEF took part in raiding
operations. Notably, the Australian
Imperial Force (AIF) had stopped
mounting such attacks, having
concluded that they generated little of
military value. A company sergeantmajor of the Australian 14th Battalion
tersely summed up the Australian
position: “Raids are not worth the
cost, none of the survivors want to
go anymore.” 6 The abandonment
of raiding by an elite attacking
formation like the AIF illustrates that
not all BEF units viewed raiding as
playing a significant role in achieving
higher troop morale or gaining vital
information about the Germans.
Nevertheless, senior officers of
the Canadian Corps continued to
give raiding a high priority during
the summer of 1917, and this is
essential context for the raids by
4th Division in the Hill 70/Lens
31
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they faced the most
sector. Very large raids
difficult conditions of
organized at the corps
any of the corps’ four
level using multiple
divisions, and suffered
brigades and battalions
the heaviest casualties.
were launched in
Nevertheless the
May and June as part
infamous raid on Hill
of the Scarpe battles.
145 mounted five weeks
Carefully planned, with
prior to Vimy, in which
the officers and men
several of Watson’s
training over taped
b at t ali on s we re al l
courses, these were
but annihilated, has
broadly successful in
raised questions among
the judgment of G.W.L.
historians as to the
Nicholson, the CEF’s
battlefield judgement
official historian.7 One
of Watson and his
such “large” raid,
GSO 1, Lieutenantexecuted around the
Colonel William
same time period as
Ironside, in 1917.9
the 4th Division’s
many raids on the Lens
Watson’s meteoric
front, was launched
rise from battalion to
on 23 July by the
divisional commander
3rd Division’s 116th
in a matter of months
Battalion. The objective
spoke of his political
for this battalion-sized
connections and savvy
raid was the railway
as much or more
embankment in the
than his operational
southern section of Lens.
performance. An
The raid successfully
outward self-confidence
reached the railway
seems to have masked
embankment where
insecurities, with the
vicious fighting broke
result that Watson
out. The Canadians
could be susceptible
succeeded in blowing
to pressure from above
Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie, commander of the Canadian Corps
up a series of dugouts
to get “results.”10 For
(left) and Major-General David Watson, commander of 4th Canadian
and captured 53
his part, Ironside
Division, both supported trench raids.
prisoners before pulling
was a brilliant young
back after 35 minutes. For its efforts,
raids) which were planned and
British staff officer, but arrogant and
the 116th suffered 74 casualties. 8
executed at the brigade and battalion
ambitious. Watson relied on the more
level and sustained day-in and dayexperienced professional as a mentor,
What useful information the raiders
out, usually leading up to a major
which was precisely the reason
gleaned has not been looked at,
attack, the nature of the 4th Division
why Ironside had been seconded
however, as the 44th Battalion would
operations that are the focus of the
to the newly formed 4th Division
discover a month later to the day, the
present study.
in the spring of 1916. But there was
formidable German defences around
By the summer of 1917,
evidence Watson, though a quick
the railway embankment were still in
Major-General David Watson had
learner who was clearly maturing as
place and undiminished. In practice,
commanded the 4th Division through
a field commander, still relied on his
the Scarpe as well as the 116th
two major battles – the latter stages
GSO1 too much, and at the wrong
Battalion operations constituted
of the Somme and Vimy Ridge – as
times, particularly considering the
massive “one-off raids” – basically
well as several lesser operations. The
degree to which Ironside’s ego and
formal attacks followed by planned
division and its commander fought
impetuosity could interfere with
withdrawals. These were in sharp
capably in their first engagement,
his own thinking. The result was
contrast to the more conventional
and also acquitted themselves rather
that neither acted as a check on
“minor operations” (as the Canadian
well in the Vimy assault, considering
the other’s decision-making. Quite
Corps referred to traditional-style
2
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rightly, Watson saw his responsibility
as carrying out higher orders –
if ordered to raid by Currie, he
would raid, and enthusiastically and
unquestioningly. His command, the
CEF’s most junior division, would
not be found wanting in élan.11
The 4th Division was blessed with
capable brigadiers, all hand-picked by
Watson. The British regular leading
the 10th, Edward Hilliam, was made
of stern Imperial stuff, a “fighter” but
also a man whose relationship with
his Canadian subordinates steadily
deteriorated until he eventually had
to be replaced. The commanders of
the 11th and 12th Brigades – Victor
Odlum and James MacBrien – were
Canadians, the former an energetic
prewar militia officer and the latter
a regular with staff officer training
and a more stolid personality. They
were the only men to command their

respective brigades in action during
the war, leading them with distinction
and much impressing Generals Byng
and Currie in the process. As much
or more than any other brigadier in
the corps, Odlum was a disciple of
raiding, having personally led many
such operations during his time
with the 7th Battalion, even while
serving as its commanding officer.
All three were personally loyal to
Watson and respectful of Ironside’s
undeniable talents. Overall, the
working relationship among brigade
and divisional headquarters was a
smooth one.12
Collectively, the 12 infantry
battalions making up the division
were ably commanded by experienced
officers, as the fighting during the
remainder of the war would confirm.
But all the units had suffered heavy
combat losses earlier in the year, and

were still integrating large numbers
of junior officer, NCO and enlisted
reinforcements into their ranks, a
time-consuming process.13
Watson commanded in a collegial
style, regularly seeking not only
Ironside’s opinion in particular, but
also the views of his brigadiers, at least
when matters directly affected them.
By predisposition, and sometimes
still by necessity, Ironside exercised
greater “command” responsibilities
than were normally associated with
his position, namely the organization
and coordination and a significant
role in the operational control of
the division. In the raiding on the
Lens front, Watson was responding
to orders from corps headquarters,
those generally emanating from
Currie’s very capable chief of staff,
Brigadier-General Percy Radcliffe. In
consultation with Ironside, Watson

LAC PA 1352

Lieutenant-Colonel William Ironside was the GSO 1 (senior staff officer) of 4th Canadian Division in 1917. Ironside, a young British
officer, was considered brilliant but arrogant and ambitious. His views held great sway as Major-General Watson relied on him as a
mentor.
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Major-General Watson was fortunate to have three capable brigadiers – Edward Hilliam of 10th Brigade (left), Victor Odlum of 11th
Brigade (centre) and James MacBrien of 12th Brigade. These men were the only commanders of their respective brigades during
the war and earned the respect of Watson, Byng and Currie.

would then issue directions to
Hilliam, Odlum or MacBrien and
their staffs to work out the specifics
of the raids with the battalions tasked
to carry them out, though the input
from battalions seems to have been
quite limited in practice throughout
the corps. During July and the first
three weeks of August, raids were
dispatched into Lens from one or
more of the 4th Division’s battalions
in an apparent rotation (all battalions
participated) about every three
days. After the raids, the “results”
were collected by the battalion,
forwarded to brigade and then to
divisional headquarters where the
intelligence acquired from all the
raids was collated, classified and
summarized. This information was
then placed at the disposal of the
divisional commander as well as the
corps commander and his staff.14
Tim Cook has argued that
within the Canadian Corps raiding
became a very competitive activity.
This growing competitiveness had
detrimental effects, as both the plans
and operations were rushed.15 While
this may have been the general case
for the Canadian Corps, during the
summer of 1917 the 4th Division
had a clear purpose in the upcoming
operation at Lens, and had plenty of
34
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time to organize and carry out raids.
The raids examined here were not just
thrown together to showcase specific
units’ skills or to keep the men in an
aggressive frame of mind.
Foremost among the arguments
for the usefulness of raiding put
forward by the Canadian Corps was
the acquisition of practical knowledge
of the enemy-held territory over
which the troops would advance
during a main assault.16 This holds
some truth, though through the
diligent employment of existing
maps, trench observation posts, and
aerial reconnaissance the terrain
was generally very well known.
Nevertheless, it was still argued
that the raiding troops would gain a
better insight into the details of the
Germans’ trenches and gun positions.
Raiding the forward German lines in
front of Lens during July and August
1917 was done during both the hours
of daylight and darkness.17 At night,
with limited visibility, learning the
lay of the land and the details of
German defences would have been
extremely difficult. During the day,
the raiders also would have faced
the obvious problem that attacking
in broad daylight would bring –
their own exposure – although they
could at least clearly see the terrain

they were crossing. No records from
these so-called “minor operations”
– the Canadian Corps’ euphemism
for raiding – demonstrate that the
4th Division’s raiders brought back
any information of such importance
that it warranted a change in overall
plans, such as altering the axis
of the main attack on Lens. The
tactical realities of Lens and the
infamous Green Crassier position
dictated the direction of the attacks
decided at brigade and divisional
level, regardless of any information
brought back by raiders.
At Lens, most tellingly, any
information the raiders may have
gained to familiarize the troops with
the ground and enemy dispositions
simply did not pay off. Almost
immediately after the 4th Division
launched its attack on 21 August
there was confusion as to where to
go, and the withering fire from the
German defenders fighting from
hidden pillboxes that raiding (and
all other intelligence gathering for
that matter) had failed to locate
began to decimate the attackers.18
The 50th Battalion’s effort to push
into the ruins of the city was typical
of the intelligence failure on the
Lens front. The intelligence reports
used by Lieutenant-Colonel Lionel
4
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Page, commanding officer of the 50th
Battalion, stated that the German
front (Aloof Trench) was weakly
held.19 Unfortunately for Page and
his men, these reports were wrong
and the 50th battalion ran into heavy
German resistance. In the words
of one signaller: “[The Germans]
launched a powerful attack against
our decimated ranks with such
ferocity that [their] onslaught drove
us back to our original position.”20
Another serious intelligence failure
that occurred despite the extensive
raiding and patrolling in Lens
contributed to the selection of the
wrong route for the 44th Battalion’s
attack on the Green Crassier two
days later. Lieutenant-Colonel
Reginald Davies had decided, based
on supposedly sound raiding and
scouting intelligence, that the chosen
route to the Green Crassier was only
lightly defended.21 Just the opposite
was true. As the Canadians made
their way to the Green Crassier,
the route was defended by tunnels
and hidden German pill boxes that
had been built into the rubble of
Lens. Hard fighting ensued and the
Canadians were forced to fall back.
The 44th Battalion suffered 260
casualties in its assault on the Green
Crassier.22 These were far from the
only examples of the vital questions
that intelligence from raiding was
supposed to answer, but had not.
In summary, the raids mounted
around Lens in the summer of 1917
did not gain information that helped
Canadian commanders and staff
officers understand how best to
navigate the terrain in major assaults
or how the enemy was deployed.

A

the 4th Canadian Division believed
they had identified the German units
facing them, the 8th and 11th Reserve
Divisions. Major-General Watson
and his staff viewed the former as
having very high fighting ability
and morale, in contrast to the latter
which they categorized as average.23
Despite this assessment Watson and
his staff did not alter their attack
plan to take advantage of the sector
held by the less effective division.
In any case, the raiding and other
forms of intelligence gathering were
only partially right, as the German
force opposing them in the Lens
area actually consisted solely of the
supposedly weaker 11th Reserve
Division.24
It has also been argued that
one of the main goals of raiding
was to keep the Germans “taut and
nervous”25 and that it “forced them
to abandon their forward posts and
patrolling, and limited their ability
to detect attacks which was being
prepared against them…keeping
German morale low.” 26 On the
Lens front, however, the Germans,
despite extensive Canadian raiding,
were thoroughly prepared when
the Canadian Corps launched its

attack, with their forward positions
fully manned and their artillery
accurately registered on the Canadian
start line. The assault companies of
the 50th Battalion had to endure a
savage German bombardment for
25 minutes before even commencing
their attack.27 The Canadians then
met stiff resistance from the forwardmost German posts whose machine
guns had bloody effect. Overall,
out of five Canadian battalions that
attacked on 21 August, only two
reached their planned objectives – the
German front lines – after a full day
of fighting, and the other three had to
return to their jumping off points.28
Though the claim that raiding was
effective at lowering the German
frontline troops’ morale is impossible
to measure, it was irrelevant in
the Lens case. The 11th Reserve
Division had been replaced by the
elite 1st Guards Reserve Division
on 20 August, a development the
Canadians were unaware of until
their attack commenced less than 24
hours later.29
Another benefit claimed for
raiding was that it stopped the
Germans from sending out their own
raids and reconnaissance patrols,
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nother often hailed benefit of
raiding was the acquisition of
information, usually from prisoners,
about enemy units, and in particular
their strength, morale, and combat
readiness. Yet how useful was this
information? Through raiding and
other forms of intelligence gathering,
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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and thus helped to mask Canadian
activities. However, historian Bill
Rawling, who argues that raiding
was aggressively pursued by both
sides over the course of the war, states
that: “[German] raids continued even
as the Canadians became more active
in trying to gain information for
upcoming offensives.” 30 This held
true on the 4th Division’s front during
the summer of 1917. Even with the
Canadian artillery pummelling the
German front lines, and the division
carrying out a very aggressive raiding
program, the Germans were still
actively patrolling no-man’s-land
as confirmed by the 38th Battalion
war diary.31 Raiding was supposed
to gather vital information, and the
German dugouts often contained
maps and other documents that
in Canadian hands would help
the corps plan its assaults more
effectively. Raiders were also under
orders to bring back prisoners who
could be interrogated on everything
from issues bearing on the upcoming
battle to how the German home front
was coping with the demands of the
war.32 A raid by the 75th Battalion
illustrated the importance placed on
capturing prisoners. As the war diary
recorded matter-of-factly:
A raid on the front line was carried
out by the platoons under Lieuts.
Brunton and Bradfield on the

morning of the 9th. The object of
this raid was to secure a prisoner
for identification purposes [and] the
raiders brought back two…33

Though the diary mentions that the
battalion suffered casualties, it does
not say how many. The purpose of
the raid was to gain information from
prisoners, information which had
already been acquired from earlier
raids, and which was unlikely to
alter the plans one way or another
during the final days before the
main assault. In the lead up to the
Lens attack, the raiders did acquire
German documents and maps, but
these did not change the plans that
had been laid out in mid-July – before
the raiding had even commenced.

I

*****

t was argued during the war –
and continues to be argued – that
raids were justified for enhancing
the attacking soldiers’ élan and thus
strengthening the Canadian Corps’
battlefield prowess. Senior officers
thought that junior officers and other
ranks would become bored and
restless with the monotony of trench
life, and raiding was something
that would break this up.34 Raiding
demanded a lot of initiative, fitness,
and bravery as the raiders had to enter
the enemy’s lines, either sabotage
German trenches or grab something of

importance for Canadian intelligence,
and flee before the enemy had time to
respond. On 28 July the 87th Battalion
carried out a raid against the 11th
Reserve Division for identification
purposes. After a sharp skirmish,
in which three Canadians were
killed and four wounded, the patrol
returned with neither useful German
documents nor prisoners.35 One is
hard pressed to see how this raid
could have raised the confidence of
the men in the 87th Battalion. With
an approaching large scale offensive,
moreover, the “monotony of trench
life” should not have set in on this
front, as the troops had only been
moved into their positions in midJuly.36 Instead of sending a constant
stream of raids into the German lines,
these soldiers, a great many of them
replacements for the division’s heavy
losses at Vimy Ridge, would surely
have benefited more by focusing on
preparations for the main assault.
The number of troops assigned to
a particular raid during the summer
of 1917 varied, usually from eight
to 30 men. In what was typical
for the organization of small raids
at the time, on 29 July the 54th
Battalion sent out a party comprising
one non-commissioned officer, two
riflemen, two rifle grenadiers and
three bombers.37 A larger raid would
have committed a force of about
30 men led by a lieutenant but

CWM EO-1857a

Canadian soldiers examine concrete German gun positions in the destroyed suburbs of Lens following the battle.
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CWM EO-1857a

CWM EO-3852

new battle theories and
otherwise would have
tactics [and that] it was
been made up of similar
the trench patrol and
proportions of NCOs,
raid that became the
bombers, grenadiers
laboratory of battle.”47
and riflemen. In August,
when the attack on Hill
Perhaps this was true on
70 was approaching, the
quiet fronts in the long
raiding parties of the 4th
months between major
Division progressively
operations. It stretches
grew in the attempt to
credibility, however,
confuse the Germans
that while preparing
as to where the corps’
for an imminent
main thrust would fall.
assault by three of
The 87th Battalion, for
the corps’ divisions
instance, launched a
there would be tactical
company sized raid on
e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n . 48
38
12 August.
None of the war diaries,
operational orders,
Some raids might
or directives from
suffer no casualties at
A German bunker near Lens, photographed in September 1917.
battalion, brigade, and
all, such as one on 12
divisional commands
August by the 38th
of the land.43 Soldiers sent to scout the
mention anything about raiding being
Battalion, though this was a rarity.39
intended to generate new tactics or
Examination of the war diaries of
route that the 44th Battalion would
ideas that would be employed in
the battalions of the 4th Division
take into Lens and up the Green
the assault on Lens. Rather the
confirms that the raiding parties
Crassier reported back that the route
documentation exclusively concerns
usually suffered five or six casualties,
was relatively clear of Germans. 44
intelligence gathering.49
though there are instances of much
Four days later, when the 44th
heavier losses. An 87th Battalion
Battalion attacked on this “relatively
In the summer of 1917, intelligence
raid on 1 August miscarried when
clear route,” it turned out that the
gained from a number of different
the Germans became aware of its
scouts had been wrong. Allen Hart,
sources made the information
presence and dropped gas shells
a private in the battalion, recounted
raiders brought back less significant.
on top of the men, inflicting eleven
after the war how unprepared they
Gathering information on the enemy’s
casualties.40 In another instance, from
were for the attack into Lens and up
forward defences came from a wide
the Green Crassier – “Well of course
range of sources including existing
the 102nd Battalion’s war diary: “a
everything was anything but lovely
maps, aerial observation, interviews
raiding party proceed[ed] up the road
because these boys got over there
with local citizens, diligent forward
…the crater was entered and their
and it was – it was no small show, it
observers, the experiences of BEF
[sic] in successfully bombed, but the
was a big show, and it hadn’t been
units previously engaged in the
lip of the crater facing the wrong way
realized how big an undertaking
same sector, “quiet” patrolling, the
we had no cover and were compelled
45
it was…” The 44th Battalion was
interception of German wireless
by heavy machine gun and rifle fire to
messages, in addition to raiding. 50
withdraw.”41 The casualties suffered
involved in vicious street fighting
46
where they suffered 260 casualties.
were four other ranks killed and
Confirmation, for example, that
seven wounded.42
the preparatory shelling severely
The disastrous attacks into Lens
disrupted the Germans’ front line
and against the Green Crassier
During July and the first
defences came from intercepted
demonstrated that the intelligence
three weeks of August, raids were
wireless communications: “the British
from all sources, including raiding,
dispatched into Lens by one or more
[sic] by destructive fire lasting for
was a failure, and that many enemy
of the 4th Division’s 12 infantry
four weeks have turned the foremost
strong points had in fact not been
Battalions about every three days.
German positions into a shell hole
located.
One private boasted before the attack
area like Flanders.” 51 Of course,
that “we even know the names of
the streets we are to march up and
these results had also been picked
the actual houses we are to mop up”
up by aerial photography. Raiding
istorians have argued that
but the troops were mistaken in their
confirmed such reports, at the cost of
“by raiding and patrolling,
belief they had a good feel for the lay
unnecessary casualties, and seemed
the Canadians experimented with

H
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Aerial photographs, such as this composite image of the northern half of Lens taken on 9 August 1917, provided
a great deal of essential intelligence for the Canadian Corps.
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the formation’s mission to deceive
the German defenders into believing
that the primary assault would be on
Lens rather than Hill 70, where the
1st and 2nd Divisions were in fact to
make main effort a few days before
the 4th Division’s attack on Lens.
Fourth Division strived mightily to
attract the enemy’s attention to Lens,
placing dummy tanks in the sector
facing the town, subjecting the town
to heavier artillery shelling than
Hill 70, and sending more raids into
Lens than the surrounding areas.52
As many historians have argued,
artillery played a crucial role in the
Canadian Corps’ success throughout
the Great War. Hill 70 and Lens
were no different. 53 In interviews
conducted after the attack, German
prisoners often mentioned how
fierce the machine gun barrage or
artillery bombardments had been,

but were silent on the raiding.54 As
Major-General Edward Morrison,
commander of the Canadian Corps
field artillery, subsequently wrote
of the role his guns had played in
convincing the Germans that the
main attack was Lens: “to our great
satisfaction the enemy put down
a tremendous barrage in front of
Lens and Avion…He was entirely
outmanoeuvred...and by the time
the Germans realized their mistake
the attacking troops [at Hill 70]
were in their final objective.”55 The
raids could only have confirmed the
Germans in their misapprehension
that the main attack would be against
Lens, but the after-action interviews
leave little doubt that the artillery
bombardment was the key to the
successful deception.56
Certainly the Lens sector was a
unique situation for raiding in the

CWM EO-1794

like a high risk activity compared
to other more passive intelligencegathering methods.
Most historians agree that raiding
was an inherently limited activity,
in the sense that raids could not
penetrate very far into enemy lines,
usually only reaching the Germans’
first line of defence. In an area
such as Lens, the pulverized ruins
of a small city, it was especially
difficult for raiding troops to find
their way. Getting useful information
from beyond the front lines by
raiding alone would have been very
challenging. At best, the information
gathered from raids could only been
of limited use, since the 4th Division’s
assault was planned to press much
farther into Lens than raiders had
been able to reconnoitre.
The 4th Division’s raids may have
been more effective in contributing to

8

1/24/2011 12:29:27 PM

CWM EO-1794

CWM 19940001-436

: What was the point? Raiding in the Summer of 1917
Canadian Corps’ history. The 4th
Division’s attack into the town on
21-24 August demonstrated that
fighting in the ruins of a built-up
area posed daunting challenges, and
underscored the unique difficulties
that the raiding program in that
same area had encountered.57 Yet, the
raids carried out in July and August
were viewed as being successful,
and not just by the 4th Division’s
own commanders. The participating
soldiers did not report difficulties
different from those encountered in
raids carried out over other types of
ground. They were confident about
the intelligence gleaned from their
prisoners and the other information
they brought back from their forays
into German lines. A 12th Infantry
Brigade report that “daylight raids
were [sent] out from 72nd Bn.,
and gained valuable information
as to the enemy defences and his
method of holding the line opposite
our front” was typical of opinion
on the utility of the raids. 58 This
confidence demonstrates that the
raids were working as the Canadians
intended. The disappointing results
of the 4th Division’s main attacks
starkly illustrate that the “valuable
information” the 12th Brigade had
received was an illusion.
One reason why the raiding might
have been ineffective on the Lens
front is that the information gathered
may have been misinterpreted.
Though the war diaries and afterbattle reports do not mention the
underlying purpose of these raids,

documents at the divisional and
corps level confirm that it was
thought success at Hill 70 would
rely to a significant degree on the
4th Division misleading the Germans
into believing that the main thrust
of the coming Canadian attack was
going to be directed at Lens.59 Perhaps
the meaning of the intelligence
gathered on other issues (such as
how well defended Lens was, how
booby-trapped the rubble and how
disorienting navigating through the
town would be for the attackers) was
ignored in pursuit of the overarching
goal for the raids: trying to confuse
the Germans about where the main
thrust of the Canadian Corps’ assault
would fall. Concerned that the 4th
Division’s feinting role succeed, corps
headquarters may have been focusing
on certain questions about Lens and
misinterpreting, downplaying or
even ignoring other information that
had been gathered which would have
been important for the second phase
of operations, the attack on Lens
itself.
By 1917, raiding was an activity
most of the BEF engaged in religiously
– only the Australians considered
raiding ineffective. Analyzing the
multitude of raids carried out in
the summer of 1917 in front of Lens
shows that for the most part the
actual operations were successfully
carried out. 60 In sum, however,
most of the intelligence gained
through raiding was either of little
importance, redundant or obtainable
by alternative means. In some cases

it was actually misleading, causing
overconfidence among the attackers
when the main assault went in. As for
disrupting the Germans, one is forced
to conclude that the raiding program
had no great effect.
This paper solely analyzes a sixweek raiding campaign carried out
by the 4th Division of the Canadian
Corps at Lens in 1917. To establish if
these conclusions have validity over
a longer period – in other words,
that raiding did not serve as vital
a role in the CEF as much of the
historical wisdom asserts, and that
there would have been few adverse
effects on the corps’ operational
effectiveness if it had been reduced
or perhaps even eliminated – would
require a far more extensive study
of raiding operations. What is clear,
however, is that the paradigm that
raiding was a worthwhile activity
must be questioned, as Canadian
military historians have recently
begun to do. Yet arguments that
there was a cult of competitiveness
in the Canadian Corps and that raids
lost their effectiveness because of
increasingly reckless behaviour do
not seem relevant in this particular
study. The 4th Division raids were
carefully planned and carried out
with specific goals in mind over a
period of weeks. They were viewed
as successful, and the information
garnered from the raiders was used –
it just happened to have had very little
of value. It is worth noting that in the
summer of 1918, the Canadian Corps
did not partake in raiding leading up

A shell bursts in the outskirts of Lens, August 1917.
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to one of its most successful attacks,
the battle of Amiens. Instead, it was
felt that the element of surprise
would bring much more benefit
for the attacking Canadians than
any information raiding would
have gleaned about, or the chaos it
would have sewn in, the enemy’s
forward defences. The extensive
employment of raiding in the Lens
sector proved of marginal use and
the resources and effort expended
could have been channelled into
different preparations which would
have been more beneficial to the Lens
operation’s success. Perhaps in the
end the raids of the 4th Division in
the summer of 1917 did not matter.
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